Publicado 2025-12-12

Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Resumo
La noción de locación exacta es frecuentemente considerada en el debate contemporáneo como una relación fundamental y primitiva. Uno de los principios controversiales que se piensa gobierna esta relación es el de Funcionalidad. La Funcionalidad es un principio según el cual ningún objeto puede tener más de una locación exacta. Las teorías contemporáneas de la locación han asumido la Funcionalidad como un axioma o como un principio supuesto por al menos una de sus definiciones locacionales. En este artículo examino los argumentos existentes en la literatura a su favor, solo para concluir que no bastan para asegurar su verdad. La Funcionalidad, como algunos han argumentado erróneamente, no es un principio metafísicamente neutro que gobierne la locación exacta, ya que impone serias restricciones a una serie de posiciones sobre la metafísica de los objetos materiales. Por lo tanto, se requiere más cautela a la hora de aceptarlo.
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