Pré-publicação
Seção temática

Disposiciones y grounding en el marco del disposicionalismo causal

PDF (English)
  • Vanessa Triviño,
  • María Cerezo
Vanessa Triviño
Rey Juan Carlos University, Madrid, Spain.
María Cerezo
Complutense University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1269

Publicado 2026-01-27

Creative Commons License

Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

Este artículo explora la presencia de relaciones de fundamentación (grounding) dentro del marco disposicional de la causación. En particular, se examina la relación que se establece entre una causa y las disposiciones cuyas manifestaciones dan lugar a un proceso causal (Mumford & Anjum, 2011). Para determinar si esta es una relación de fundamentación, se evalúan dos criterios clave: (i) la satisfacción de las características estándar que suelen atribuirse a la fundamentación —irreflexividad, asimetría y transitividad—, y (ii) el cumplimiento del criterio negativo según el cual las relaciones de fundamentación no son ni relaciones de identidad ni relaciones causales.

PDF (English)

Referências

  1. Armstrong, D.M. (1969). Dispositions are causes. Analysis, 30(1), 23-26.
  2. Audi, P. (2012). Grounding: Toward a theory of the In-Virtue-Of relation. Journal of Philosophy, 109, 685-711.
  3. Baltimore, J. A. (2022). Dispositionalism, causation, and the interaction gap. Erkenntnis, 87, 677-692.
  4. Bernstein, S. (2016). Grounding is not causation. Philosophical Perspectives, 30(19), 21-38.
  5. Bird, A. (1998). Dispositions and antidotes. The Philosophical Quarterly, 48(191), 227-234.
  6. Bricker, P. (2006). The relation between the general and the particular: Entailment vs. supervenience. In D. Zimmerman (Ed.), Oxford studies in metaphysics (Vol. 2, pp. 251–287). Oxford University Press.
  7. Clark, M. J., & Liggins, D. (2012). Recent work on grounding. Analysis, 72(4), 812-823.
  8. Correia, F., & Merlo, G. (2022). Cross-temporal grounding. Analytic Philosophy, 65, 333-352.
  9. Correia, F., & Schnieder, B. (Eds.) (2012). Metaphysical grounding: Understanding the structure of reality. Cambridge University Press.
  10. Daly, Ch. (2012). Scepticism about grounding. In F. Correia & B. Schnider (Eds.), Metaphysical grounding: Understanding the structure of reality (pp. 81-100). Cambridge University Press.
  11. Dancy, J. (2004). Ethics without principles. Oxford University Press.
  12. Dasgupta, S. (2014a). On the plurality of grounds. Philosopher’s Imprint, 14(20), 1-28.
  13. Dasgupta, S. (2014b). The possibility of physicalism. The Journal of Philosophy, 111(9/10), 557-592.
  14. Fine, K. (2001). The question of realism. Philosophers’ Imprint, 1, 1-30.
  15. Fine, K. (2012). A guide to ground. In F. Correia & B. Schnider (Eds.), Metaphysical grounding: Understanding the structure of reality (pp. 37-80). Cambridge University Press.
  16. Heil, J. (2005). Dispositions. Synthese, 144, 343-356.
  17. Hofweber, T. (2009). Ambitious, yet modest, metaphysics. In D. Chalmers, D. Manley & R. Wasserman (Eds), Metametaphysics: New essays on the foundations of ontology (pp. 260-289). Oxford University Press.
  18. Johnston, M. (1992). How to speak of the colors. Philosophical Studies, 68, 221-263.
  19. Kimpton-Nye, S. (2022). Pandispositionalism and the metaphysics of powers. Synthese, 200(371), 1-21.
  20. Kistler, M., & Gnassounou, B. (Eds.) (2016). Dispositions and causal powers. Routledge.
  21. Kortabarria, M. (2023). A defense on the usefulness of ‘Big-G’ grounding. Metaphysica, 24(1), 147-174.
  22. Koslicki, K. (2015). The coarse-grainedness of grounding. In K. Bennett & D. W. Zimmerman (Eds.), Oxford studies in metaphysics, Vol. 9 (pp. 306-344). Oxford University Press.
  23. Leuenberger, S. (2014). Grounding and necessity. Inquiry, 57(2), 151-174.
  24. Lenart, K. (2021). Grounding, essence, and contingentism. Philosophia, 49, 2157-2172.
  25. Lowe, E. J. (2010). On the individuation of powers. In A. Marmodoro (Ed.), The metaphysics of powers: Their grounding and their manifestations, Routledge.
  26. Marmodoro, A. (2013). The metaphysics of powers: Their grounding and their manifestations. Routledge.
  27. McKenzie, K. (2022). Fundamentality and grounding. Cambridge University Press.
  28. McKitrick, J. (2003). A case for extrinsic dispositions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81(2), 155-174.
  29. McKitrick, J. (2004). A defence of the causal efficacy of dispositions. Sats: Nordic Journal of Philosophy, 5, 110-130.
  30. McKitrick, J. (2005). Are dispositions causally relevant? Synthese, 144, 357-371.
  31. Mellor, D.H. (1974). In defence of dispositions. The Philosophical Review, 83, 157-181.
  32. Moore, G.E. (1920). External and internal relations. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 20, 40-62.
  33. Molnar, G. (2003). Powers: A study in metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
  34. Mumford, S. (1998). Dispositions. Oxford University Press.
  35. Mumford, S. (2004). Laws in nature. Routledge.
  36. Mumford, S., & Anjum, R. (2011). Getting causes from powers. Oxford University Press.
  37. Raimondi, A. (2022). Can causal powers cause their effects? Metaphysica, 23(2), 455-473. https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2022-0001
  38. Raven, M. (2013). Is ground a strict partial order? American Philosophical Quarterly, 50, 191-199.
  39. Richardson, K. (2021). Grounding is necessary and contingent. Inquiry, 64(4), 453-480.
  40. Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2015). Grounding is not a strict order. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1(3), 517-534.
  41. Schaffer, J. (2009). On what grounds what. In D. Chalmers, D. Manley & R. Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics (pp. 347-383). Oxford University Press.
  42. Schaffer, J. (2016). Grounding in the image of causation. Philosophical Studies, 173, 49-100.
  43. Schneider, B. (2016). A certain kind of trinity: Dependence, substance, and explanation. Philosophical Studies, 129, 393-419.
  44. Shoemaker, S. (1980). Causality and properties. In P. van Inwagen (Ed.), Time and cause: Essays presented to Richard Taylor (pp. 109-135). Reidel.
  45. Tugby, M. (2021). Grounding theories of powers. Synthese, 198, 11187-11216.
  46. Tugby, M. (2022). Dispositional realism without dispositional essences. Synthese, 200, 222.
  47. Turner, J. (2016). The facts in logical space: A tractarian ontology. Oxford University Press.
  48. Wilson, J. (2014). No work for a theory of grounding. Inquiry, 57(5-6), 535-579.
  49. Wilson, J. (2016). The unity and priority arguments for grounding. In K. Aizawa & C. Gillet (Eds.), Scientic composition and metaphysical ground (pp. 171-204). Palgrave MacMillan.
  50. Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-philosophicus. Routledge & Kegan Paul.