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Deep and Deeper Disagreements in Metaphysics of Science

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  • Bruno Borge,
  • Dalila Serebrinsky
Bruno Borge
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina / Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Dalila Serebrinsky
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1298

Publicado 2026-01-27

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Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

This paper bridges the epistemology of disagreement and metaphysics of science by advancing the idea that disagreements in scientific ontology can be understood as instances of deep disagreement exhibiting varying degrees of depth. We first establish the core features of deep disagreements and argue that standard accounts fail to accommodate their gradable nature. Taking the debate between empiricist and metaphysical stances in scientific ontology as a paradigmatic case, we show how this disagreement satisfies all criteria for deep disagreement. We then develop a framework, building on recent work in the epistemology of disagreement, showing how the depth of disagreements correlates with the generality of principles in conflict. Through a detailed case study of debates about modality in scientific ontology, we demonstrate three levels of depth: disagreements between perspectives (deepest), disagreements within perspectives about specific domains (intermediate), and disagreements within sub-positions (shallowest). This analysis reveals that deep disagreements in metaphysics of science are not monolithic but exhibit a rich structure that explains both their persistence and the differential progress possible across different debates. Our framework provides both theoretical insight into the nature of philosophical disagreement and practical guidance for understanding the limits and prospects of metaphysics of science.

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